

THE HARD REALITY OF SOFT POWER: MISINTERPRETATION AND CONFLICTING VALUES IN EAST ASIA

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Abstract. Soft power has often been viewed as a concept that presents great economic and diplomatic opportunities for nations in East Asia—a region plagued by historical animosities decades after the end of the Pacific War. Unfortunately, despite the allure of soft power there exist fundamental misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the concept originally defined by Joseph Nye. One major oversight is the disregard for the importance of understanding values within soft power creation. Without a concrete understanding of the perception of values amongst the vastly varied cultures of the world, attempts to gain soft power may backfire in an unexpected manner. After an overview of three case examples of Japan, China, and South Korea, this paper argues that other fields of the social sciences must be included within future research for the sake of effective application and understanding of soft power within East Asia.

SOFT POWER WITHIN EAST ASIA UNDER THE SHADOWS OF THE PAST

The Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women system, the Diaoyu/Senkaku¹ islands, and the Yasukuni shrine—these issues and others have marred the image of Japan within East Asia since the end of the Pacific War. Each issue carries with it strong emotions and complex narratives that are manifested within the respective education systems, news media, and memorials of mainland China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan (Emmott, 2008, p. 209-228). Historical and political disagreements have extended beyond individuals into international politics and continue to present serious problems for reconciliation within the region (Tanaka, 2007, p. 9-10). While views of Japan's influence naturally vary depending on the country in question, within East Asia, Japan can be viewed in a very negative manner and there have been numerous instances where large protests have occurred over Japan's handling of longstanding historical and political issues, especially regarding visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese politicians (Tanaka, 2008, p. 119, 137). Those offended in mainland China by such visits to the shrine have taken part in nation-wide protests, resulting in statements such as those from Peng Zhen to Japanese Diet members that, "if strangled too much by the past issues, we cannot proceed with friendship" (Tanaka, 2008, p. 126). History still plays a significant role within the politics of East Asia.

Historical disagreements regarding territory have recently flared up again with the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands row in Fall of 2012. Claiming to be fully within the bounds of international law (Japanese MOFA, 2012), the islands were purchased by the Japanese government from the previous private owner after a bid was first proposed by the then governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara (Ryall, 2012). This set off a strong backlash of protest within East Asia, especially in mainland China where the protests sometimes turned into violent riots which frequently targeted Japanese products, from Japanese restaurants to Japanese cars.

In addition to the row over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, there has been growing concern over the possibility of the reelected Japanese Prime Minister Abe going forward with revising previous statements of apology over the use of comfort women during the Pacific War due to past statements (Onishi, 2006). The issue over sexual slavery during the Pacific War has been a reoccurring and

highly controversial topic; however the recent concern over the recognition of past apologies was further compounded by the Mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, claiming that comfort women served a necessary role during the war (Tabuchi, 2013). Post-war disagreements over history and agreements signed at the end of the Pacific War continue to rebound and threaten to destabilize the region (BBC, 2012; Voigt, 2012; Emmott, 2009).

With these historical disagreements consistently looming in the background of international relations in East Asia, the concept of soft power has proven to be very attractive to Japan, China, and South Korea. The application of the economy fueled entertainment media and culture industries for the generation of political influence within a rival nation's social and political structure is an alluring opportunity for any government. Within each country exists a difference cultural context, and thus, there exist variations in interpretation and methods of obtaining effective soft power. Considering media especially, Japan has focused much attention on its popular culture market, such as animation, for obtaining soft power; there has been a significant volume of research in aspects of this area (McGray, 2002; Iwabuchi, 2002; Lam, 2007), even in contexts such as China, a nation known for its stridently anti-Japanese narratives (Lam, 2007, p. 349-351; Shirk, 2007, p. 140-180). However, in China's case, attempts at gaining soft power can be seen in the form of attempting to curry favor in the international community for supporting its own rise to power through image and narrative creation (Wang, 2003, p. 48-52). As for South Korea, one of its TV dramas has proven effective in regards to soft power within specific groups. The drama *Winter Sonata*, dominated the Japanese media market in the early 2000s, despite animosities over issues such as comfort women remaining from the Japanese colonial era, but not without a nationalist backlash (Hayashi & Lee, 2007, p. 207-208).

Yet, what exactly is soft power, and how is the concept specifically defined? According to Joseph Nye who coined the term in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Nye, 1990 Third), soft power equates to "getting others to want the outcomes that you want – [it] co-opts people rather than coerces them." Nye goes on to state that, "soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" (Nye, 2002, p. xi, 5). There are three areas that Nye identifies as critical to a nation's soft power: it's culture, political values, and foreign policy (Nye, 2002 p. 11; Nye, 2013 NEWS). Within this broad and malleable list, one aspect remains a common thread; the expression of the values held and expressed by the nation itself. The core concept of culture used by Nye is that of culture being "... the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society." While a society may hold a variety of values and practices depending on the ethnic backgrounds and regional practices of individuals and groups, it is through political system that such values may be formulated for official political purposes and recognition within a society. Lastly, such values expressed by a nation and its culture are then reflected in foreign policy and the methods of dealing with foreign nations their citizens. (Nye, 2013, News)

In this respect, the perception of shared values is a fundamental for soft power. Those who perceive shared common values may view themselves in the same group as those who might otherwise be viewed as outsiders-effectively seeing themselves on the same team or at least possess a sense of camaraderie. With the perception of shared values, a nation's cultural allure can promote political and economic agendas, and possibly avoid employing riskier hard power tactics such as military threats (Nye, 2002). As intriguing as soft power might appear, measuring the perception of shared values, as well as other more abstract and ubiquitous factors such as the affect of media, is exceptionally difficult.

Unlike the concept of soft power, hard power is relatively straight-forward by comparison. Hard power consists of “carrots” and/or “sticks,” or inducements and threats (Nye, 2002, p. 5). For calculating hard power, one might analyze and quantify each nation’s military capacity, such as charting correlations with economic or regional concessions in comparison to military threats and attacks. Economic hard power might involve the use of such tactics as freezing bank accounts, bribing persons of political influence, or funding opposition groups. It is important to understand, however, that using economic might to dominate a nation from within its own borders is not soft power. Capital fueled image creation by the government does also not qualify as soft power, and is more closely related propaganda, values are not shared, values are declared directly from the government in power. Nonetheless, it is important to note there has been some discussion as to the role of foreign direct investment, foreign aid, and military image in regards to soft power, especially in the case of mainland China's strategies (McGiffert, 2009, p. 1, 3-4; Kurlantzick, 2008, p. 4). Regardless of such discussions however, the importance of understanding shared values in connection to soft power is paramount, and co-option is not possible if force of any overt kind is employed, or there exists majority of blatant oppositional and conflicting values.

SOFT POWER: LIMITATIONS, RISKS, AND PROMISE

Sources of soft power are highly ubiquitous, springing forth from variety of sources including media products, political activities, or cultural exchange programs (Nye, 2002; Iwabuchi, 2002). Currently, the Achilles heel of understanding soft power may not be the lack of quantitative measurement per say, but rather the weak connection between understanding how soft power is generated and its subsequent application by governments. Prior to any attempt at co-option through utilization of popular culture industries or direct funding of exchange initiatives, there must be an understanding of the intricacies of the varied cultures and values. Constructivism may play a greater role than other branches of international relations theory in this matter; however, other social sciences, such as anthropology and sociology, may be the most beneficial in regards to giving the strongest edge for understanding various cultures, which is necessary for appropriate application of soft power by governments.

The above is not intended to imply that there is no potential for soft power within East Asia, as soft power still does offer tantalizing opportunities for nations, but rather is intended to serve to as a warning to the overeager. In fact, there have been indications from a small scale case study, utilizing statistical data from AsiaBarometer² and interviews with mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, that soft power may have a diluting effect on negative views of Japan based on hard power related concerns (Berry, 2010, p. 13). Yet, it is crucial to note that there still has been no research showing that soft power can directly entirely override or concerns related to hard power by other nations. Quite the contrary, there have been examples in which products and entities often seen associated with soft power facilitation have become targets; the most recent example being the riots in China connected with the row over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands where Japanese goods, restaurants, and images were targets for destruction (Economist, 2012; Ashcraft, 2012a). Aspects frequently argued to be beneficial (or at least neutral) for soft power are not singular in purpose, and may serve as kindling for nationalist flare ups over hard power related concerns.

Nye's work on soft power, while intriguing from the point of view of international relations, still lacks the necessary specificity for understanding the role of values within its application; specificity that does exist in other research fields, such as other social sciences. Such research on values

outside of the international relations field cannot be seen as autonomous nor generalized. Nye himself warns that the context in which popular culture goods exist may either raise or lower the amount of soft power a nation possess, and at times may also repel due to perceived oppositional values (Nye, 2004, p. 12, 55). For example, whereas more traditional values such as filial piety or seniority might be common within South Korea, mainland China, and Japan (regional variations aside), these may directly contradict more individualistic based value systems. Applying the research of Hofstede et al. on culture and values, especially the cultural dimensions model, could be highly beneficial to understanding the underlying mechanics of soft power and the connection with values (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 12-38).

While actively fostering industries, organizations, and projects that are often associated with soft power creation may be seen as a simple step for nations-especially if it appears to be beneficial to alleviating longstanding historical grievances-to seek soft power within any region without careful forethought is naïve and carries numerous risks. By no means is soft power a concept that can be uniformly applied to any situation via cultural production without consideration to the cultural context in which it exists in tandem (Nye, 2004, p. 11-12, 52). Without consideration and a deeper understanding of cultural values in context, attempts at wielding soft power by nations can backfire in unforeseen ways. As mentioned previously, there is the possibility that soft power devices, such as cultural goods and media, also play a role within oppositional movements and may result in nationalistic opposition (Hayashi & Lee, 207-208) when perceived values are opposed by existing cultures. Soft power, like hard power, must be exercised with equal caution.

Japan: Animated Values?

Seen by some as an insular nation that was sitting on considerable untapped potential soft power, Japan has now spread its cultural goods throughout the world and has become a common example of soft power in East Asia (Nye, 2004, p. 85-86; McGray, 2002) for better and for worse. Previously touted for its rapid economic development, Japan is now viewed again within the flying goose model for soft power propagation; an example for other less developing lesser nations within the Asia to follow for economic prosperity (Nye, 2002, p. 84-85; Emmott, p. 38).

One of the most popular cultural industries for Japan is the *manga/anime* industry (Japanese comic books/graphic novels and Japanese animation). This specific popular culture industry has been viewed as one of Japan's strongest opportunities for soft power within East Asia, even so far as to be touted as the "way to China's heart" by former Prime Minister Aso Taro (Lam, 2008, p. 349-351). However, there can be difficulty in understanding the narratives, culture, and values portrayed in such media. Anime or manga created in a nation and then thrust into the foreign market of another nation that often is structured entirely differently brings about numerous problems, such as differing linguistic terms, cultural norms, meta-narratives. This can lead to the intended meaning can be entirely lost, misinterpreted, or reinterpreted into an entirely different meaning. When foreign localization companies are involved in distribution of content overseas, large changes can result which can change core aspects of the material. One of the most well-known examples of such a case is the first localization of Hayao Miyazaki's *Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind* in the United States of America.

Within the Japanese animation industry Hayao Miyazaki is revered as one of the key figures of world recognized anime content, known for films such as *Princess Mononoke* and *Spirited Away*³

(Time, 2005). Beyond the language being that of Japanese for the original production of Miyazaki's works, there can exist a variety of concepts that may be difficult for foreign audiences to understand, such as region specific religious references, holidays, or social practices. Changes are often made to media when released in foreign countries by the publishing and distribution companies which can drastically affect the way values are portrayed within the narrative of the work. Regardless of the world renowned popularity of Hayao Miyazaki's work-which often focus on themes of nature, family, and love-his films faced localization and editing, when entering into a foreign market officially. During the process of localization for his film *Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind*, severe cuts and edits were made to the narrative of the film by New World Pictures to the degree that Miyazaki was horrified of the result and the original animation studio in Japan, Studio Ghibli-the studio at which Miyazaki worked-publicly denounced the edited film and requested his fans forget its existence. (Toyama, 2013) When Disney later obtained rights for the release of *Princess Mononoke* in the United States and requested a list of cuts to be made from the film. Miyazaki's producer responded by sending a Japanese *katana* with the message attached, "no cuts." Disney backed down and the film was released unedited (Brooks, 2005).

While the localization process for media can play a strong role in the reinterpretation and re-expression of values, the cultural imprint may still remain and while certain Japanese manga may be "culturally odorless," (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 27) this cannot be said for all genres. Just as with film, literature, and other forms of media, the range is broad, deep, and not always a pleasant experience for the user. Japanese video games, manga, and fashion may transfer and sell successfully in other nations with appropriate marketing techniques, but whether dating simulator games, adult pornographic manga/anime, and other niche and local markets will succeed outside of Japan is an entirely different issue. Furthermore, certain media may even be illegal in other nations, such as in certain states within the United States where individuals have been arrested for possession of material deemed to child pornography under the regional definition (Kelts, 2011).

The best example of such material is Japan's *lolicon manga*, which often depicts child-like characters in erotic situations and would constitute child pornography under numerous foreign laws. Within the US, there have already been cases of US citizen's being arrested under charges of possession of child pornography for manga collections that depicted underage characters. In Japan as well, there was a recent push by to criminalize characters under. (Kanemitsu, 2010) Anime often has characters depicted with cute child-like features. Two methods of artistic description are *chibi* and/or *SD* (Super Deformed)⁴, both of which can appear to portray exceeding youthful and childlike depictions of characters that may be adults in the narrative of the text. These characters can easily be interpreted to be underage characters engaging in adult activity.

Anime and manga may be useful for obtaining soft power; however, it is important to understand that such media has many layers, not all of which are socially acceptable or legal in foreign nations, even within the country of origin. Supporting and/or investment in marketing cultural products in foreign nations as a diplomatic tool may be a risky investment without gauging the political effects. This is especially the case with nations such as China which contains a segment of a population that has a great distaste for Japan.

China: Image Creation and Government Control

China's goals are grander than Japan's in regards to soft power. The Chinese government has put much effort towards espousing the image of a peaceful rise, peaceful development, and cooperation

with other nations (McGiffert, 2009, p. 2-9). As mainland China continues to grow in power, so does the risk of conflict between other nations. Power transition theory indicates that the likelihood of conflict rises as nation-states transition in power between each other. However, China would not benefit from such conflict as much of the legitimacy of the government depends on a steady GDP increase of approximately 10% and economic stability which is directly linked to foreign markets and investment that would be likely lost in the case of a large-scale war (Shirk, 2007, p. 19-25). China would, however, benefit if soft power was effectively used and other rival nations viewed its interests in line with China's. For China, soft power is a tool to play down the worries of the international community during its rise to power. China is under the belief that if it can maintain steady growth while avoiding any major conflicts prior to 2025, when its population is expected to begin aging and its work force dwindling, then it will rise to the status of a superpower (Shirk, 2007, p. 20-21).

Again, Nye's definition of soft power is important to remember, as it does not concern manufactured image creation by the government or propaganda. Image creation is nothing new for China and its Propaganda Department, which has been extremely belligerent towards Japan in recent years pushing images of Japanese brutality onto the airwaves (Shirk, 2007, p. 171). Only recently has there been a crackdown on anti-Japanese dramas by the government run television content regulators, but only in regards to the opposition of outlandish portrayals instead of more serious war dramas (a Reuters, 2013). Anti-Japanese war dramas still are highly prevalent and some actors even specialize in playing Japanese soldiers within them. (b Reuters, 2013) It is no surprise that China would take a similarly outward image based approach towards soft power. It is not an image of a powerful yet peaceful China nor one of one that supports an anti-Japanese historical narrative that soft power is created, but a rather a China that shows through actions, politics, and non-governmental sectors, that it shares other nations' values under Nye's original definition (Nye, 2004, p. 11).

It is worth stating that there has been consideration that evaluation of the soft power of China must include investment, foreign aid, and military image within the definition of soft power, especially in the case of mainland China's strategies (McGiffert, 2009, p. 1, 3-4; Kurlantzick, 2008, p. 4). However, this is arguably a reinterpretation of the original meaning of the concept of soft power; a move towards a justification of image creation and the claim that soft power creation is directed by governments. (Economist, 2013) In a recent article, Joseph Nye has himself stated that China has misunderstood soft power in believing that the government is the main source, and that much comes from, "...individuals, the private sector, and civil society" (Nye Article, 2013).

While China speaks of a peaceful rise and attempts to wield its own soft power, it also attempts to limit the influence of other nations media. China attempts to block or limit media from other nations for political purposes regularly (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 108). China's case is unique within these examples in that the government controls the avenues of local media between the domestic population and other nations. There are specific regulations even limiting the number of hours for foreign television programs and movies allowed into mainland China depending on the nation of origin (Yasushi & McConnell, 2008. p. 122-123). However, the internet now provides easy access to previously blocked material despite government firewalls. There are many avenues for obtaining content online ranging from torrents to Chinese specific download sites that make up for a large amounts of lost revenue for Japan, a fraction inevitably due to piracy in mainland China (Schwabach, 2007, p. 12; Nakano, 122). There also exist applications on mobile smart devices such as PPS.tv, which can stream Japanese content and content from anywhere around the world.

Filtering of incoming soft power influence through government controlled media may be ultimately impossible in the age of the internet, even for China and all of its firewall technology.

Ultimately, rather than government led image creation, China needs to allow the development of their own culture industry. As Joseph Nye has said himself, China needs to realize that the government itself is not the main instrument of soft power itself (Nye article, 2013). While governments may be able to effectively fund culture industries that generate soft power, there is a fine line-if any-between government created imagery for a nation, and simple propaganda; propaganda which does not reflect the image or values that others share.

South Korea: Niche Marketing and Nationalist Backlash

In the case of South Korea the “Korean Wave” is the most prominent example of Korean soft power, both in effectiveness as well as the subsequent unintended side effects. The analysis made of the Korean Wave by Hayashi & Lee (2007) may be one of the best way examples currently in regards to analysis of the effect and application of soft power on an niche group and cultural consumption.

The Korean Wave had a highly connective effect on women in Japan who later explored Korean culture after watching a South Korean romantic drama called Winter Sonata on NHK, with much focus of the media often being on that of the middle-aged super fan (Hayashi & Lee, 2007, p. 202, 205). While a broad audience is almost always preferable, “narrowcasting” to specific groups who are receptive can be a beneficial path to soft power creation (Nye, 2002, p. 111). Based on surveys by the Kyodo News Agency, there was a slight improvement in sentiment towards South Korea from Japan following the beginning of the Korean Wave (Hayashi & Lee, 2007, p. 213). Even with the arguable success of Korean dramas in Japan, a nationalistic backlash occurred, most notably with the publication of manga titled *Ken-kanryuu 1* and *2* respectively that vilified the Korean Wave as a conspiracy. The sudden encounter with Korean dramas within Japanese society in fact had triggered a wave of distrust towards even the media companies within Japan promoting Korean dramas (Hayashi & Lee, 2007, pp. 207-208). Soft power had brought forth latent nationalist sentiment, which raises the question as to the role of Japanese soft power in both China and South Korea among narratives of wartime historical atrocities. Where many middle-aged women in Japan may viewed the drama and seen many values reflected that were relatable, others saw it as an attack on their own on a nationalistic level.

It can be argued that the Korean Wave has not yet ended, or another of undetermined size has resurged with the pervasiveness of the release of Gungnam Style in mid 2012, a popular music video by pop artist Psy (Cha, 2013). The music video, which portrays a brightly dressed man in various situations, ogling women and horse gallop dancing through crazy backdrops, was a worldwide success and has brought back the Korean Wave back into consideration within soft power. It also is part of a deeper narrative parodying aspects of class based culture in South Korea, something that was often lost on foreign audiences who primarily enjoyed the video for the music and absurdity. (Fisher, 2012)

Yet the reception of Gungam Style in Japan was in stark comparison to the its almost uniform popularity and saturation around the world and internet media, only some remixes have successfully sold in Japan (McCann, 2013; Ashcraft, 2012b). It is possible that the lack of popularity of

Gungnam style in Japan is connected to a row between South Korea and Japan over territory known as the Dokdo/Takeshima islands which flared up recently in the middle of 2012 (BBC, 2012), as Japan has been rather receptive to Korea pop music in the past. Despite the language of the music video being exclusively in Korean popularity of the song surged, this time remixes and remakes of the video began to appear around the internet. However, it still remains to be seen if this next wave will grow or wane, especially within East Asia, where territorial disputes and historical disagreements have recently become enflamed.

While Winter Sonata resonated with a niche audience in Japan while igniting nationalist opposition, where as Gungnam style was relative ignored by a Japanese audience for reasons still under consideration. Such cases provide unique examples for case studies as to how popular culture is consumed. Understanding the reflection and perceptions of values within Winter Sonata on a more descriptive level, as well as the message and reception content such as Gungnam Style, is necessary for expanding the understanding of soft power creation within each flow of the Korean Wave.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF SOFT POWER FROM HERE FORWARD

Despite the above mentioned weaknesses, the concept of soft power holds promise for exploring and understanding the influence of nations' expressed and perceived values on the international political stage; however, in order for soft power to be effectively quantified and utilized by nation-states at the international level and the findings of research to be explored and applied effectively, there are steps that must be taken. These steps are based on a foundation that the core concept of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye is understood and not misrepresented as the economic might of a culture industry or pure image creation, but rather including shared culture and values. There must also be recognition that there exists the possibility for a nationalist backlash to what may be perceived as an invasion of foreign culture and values, as was the case with the Korean Wave.

Soft power cannot be oversimplified and still carry expectations of effectiveness. It is not simply creating popular cultural media that sells well in hopes that if the media is enjoyed, so will the producing nation. It is not government manufactured image creation, with the government attempting to act as a gate keeper. Nor is soft power the use of economic might in other more indirect forms. If there is ever to be hope for soft power being useful for assisting in remedies for such major political issues such as the historical disagreements and territorial disputes within East Asia, then there must be an accurate understanding of the definition. Soft power is not an issue of political dominance through. Soft power in fact offers promise for many nations a stage to move forward on difficult issues facing Asia and the rest of the world. Nye has stated:

“...the only way you can solve these [transnational] problems, and this is where many of our greatest challenges are coming [sic] this century, is through cooperation. Through working together. Which means that soft power becomes more important, that ability to organize networks, to be able to deal with these kinds of problems, and to be able to get cooperation. Another way of putting it, is that as we think of power in the 21st century, we want to get away from the idea that power is always zero sum, my gain is your loss, and vice-versa. Power can also be positive sum, where your gain can be my gain (Nye Ted Talk, 2010).”

Understanding cultural values on a deeper level is critical. If a government is to wield soft power effectively, then an understanding of how specific cultural products, their construction and role. Moreover, there must be a much more concrete understanding of the social aspects of values within the concepts and role of soft power. While originally proposed within international relations, soft power now needs more grounding within the fields of the social sciences. The research by Hayashi and Lee is an apt example for how a case study on cultural consumption and soft power can be merged. However, it's important to understand and connect the perception of values further. Expanding such research into other regions of the Korean Wave, and other instances of culture and media consumption will advance understanding in regards to how culture is consumed and how such consumption may correlate to with the perception of shared values due to commonly consumed media.

The existence of soft power is rarely called into question; however, its practical and predictable application within international relations is still unreliable. It's creation via government initiatives and reliable application through popular culture industry is still rather questionable due to the lack of connection with the perception of values, culture consumption, and political activity of the consumer groups. If there is no direct connection to the actions of the state and international politics, and frequent misinterpretation of the core concepts of soft power, then there is little hope for taking advantage of what it may offer for the future of East Asia.

NOTES

¹ Because of the unsettled and ongoing row over the ownership of the islands, the author has decided to use both the Chinese and Japanese name for the sake of reference and neutrality.

² AsiaBarometer is a project started in 2003 to create a large data set for understanding the dynamics primarily of Asia and the general population. It consists of questions concerning viewpoints on life, politics, cultures, and religions, for expansive comparative research.

³ These titles are the English versions. The original Japanese names of Princess Mononoke and Spirited Away are: Mononoke Hime, and Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi. Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind was translated from Kaze no Tani no Naushika.

⁴ At times, the styles SD and chibi refer to the same style depending on the context.

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