Ethno-religious Conflicts and State Fragility in Africa:
Trends and Prospects for The 21st Century

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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the Mano River Basin in West Africa, Nigeria, Sudan/Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Great Lakes region of East Central Africa, and argues that the structure of ethno-religious conflicts in Africa, which are largely the aftermath of colonialism, intensify state fragility, lack of governmental capacity, and inability to sustain democracy. The paper argues that ethnicity and religion in Africa are more than aspects of politics in the struggle for power. They are indications of unresolved issues of citizenship, ineffective leadership, and the failure of ill-defined nation-building efforts bereft of ideology, and a compelling need for territorial restructuring as in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Examining several key ethno-religious African conflicts, the paper concludes that a combination of good governance and territorial restructuring are fundamental to Africa's stable future and development in the 21st century.

INTRODUCTION
Conflicts in Africa are not abating, whether ethnic, religious, or purely political. Indeed they are escalating. In the early years of political independence in the 1960s into the 1980s, such conflicts led to incessant military coups (in some cases military coups led to conflicts and civil wars). However, from the 1990s to date, these conflicts have led to intractable civil wars that have contributed to state fragility and state failure (Bates, 2001; Herbst, 1996/97; O'Connell, 1970; Rothenberg, 2001; Zartman, 1995). As we shall argue shortly, many of these conflicts have remained ethno-religious, as for example in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda and the Great Lakes of Africa, Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Southern Sahara. In fact, countries like Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, which appeared stable and prosperous from the 1960s to 1990s, have witnessed severe crises and conflicts since the early 2000s. Some of these conflicts have been patently ethnic, while others have been ethno-religious in nature.

DR Congo, along with the Great Lakes of Africa, witnessed the worst conflicts ever in Africa in the 1990s. Sudan was at war for over five decades, from 1956 to 2005. But instead of eradicating conflict, the country added the war in its Darfur region in 2003. Nigeria fought a civil war from 1967 to 1970 that was believed to have corrected...
some structural defects in the federation that had been responsible for the conflicts in the country in the early years of independence, 1960-1966. But in spite of the re-structuring of the federation into smaller units, a 36-state structure instead of a four-regional structure, Nigeria has continued to witness ethno-religious strife that has intensified fragility as well as stalled economic development. Indeed, there was until recently a pseudo-ethnic conflict ravaging the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria since the 1990s.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that such ethno-religious conflicts in Africa are predictable and explainable. The type of ethno-religious configurations in African at independence in the 1960s could not have produced anything different from the conflicts and fragility of states for which Africa is associated. Colonial disengagement in Africa and the eventual granting of independence, both by omission and commission, at times out of conspiracy, did not provide postcolonial Africa the requisites for nation-building. Nationalist leadership could not have emerged from the type of territorial and ethno-religious contrivances the colonial administrations left behind. And without such leadership, stability, nation- and state-building efforts, overall development became difficult.

Put differently, the structures and the conditions colonialism left behind in Africa at independence, though not sufficient reasons, made crises, conflicts and fragility inevitable, because the structures were inherently conflicting. And in almost all the cases the reasons for conflict were the same: quest for identity, citizenship and citizenship rights; access and control of state power for self-determination, provision of social services and other rights. This paper is of the view that until the distortions in ethno-religious and territorial configurations are corrected, the waste in energy and resources in "fighting it out" will not allow Africa the peace and stability needed for development.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part examines the theoretical arguments for conflict and fragility in Africa. The second part outlines the nature of conflict, identifying four cases of conflict and the nature of corresponding state fragility. The third and concluding section proposes a solution to fragility in the form of a constitutional restructuring of African territories to allow autonomy and self-determination to nationalities where ethno-religious conflicts are intractable.

CONFLICTS AND FRAGILITY IN AFRICA

Fragility, closely related to a lack of political integration Africa, has suffered since independence in the 1960s. Correspondingly, lack of political integration may be associated with three factors. The first factor is the existence of many multi-ethnic, religious, or multi-national groups that do not have a long history of association with one another (Furnivall, 1948 and Mill,1958, as cited in Lijphart, 1977). The second is the nature of the leadership emerging from societies lacking political integration. Indeed, leadership is critical in terms of its caliber or capacity to promote nationalist ideologies and other means of integration. The third factor is modernization and economic development and the expectations that they foster, impacting political integration and stability, that is, whether a state is fragile and unstable or united, stable and developing. A rigorous analysis of these factors provides an outline of a simple theoretical statement that helps to explain why African states remain fragile and are not developing (Ake, 1996, 2000; O'Connell, 1966).

A key factor which must not be ignored in examining fragility in Africa is the role of the colonial administration in preparing for African political independence. The colonial masters represented a power interest group who favored certain African ethnic groups during the process of power allocation in the colonial territories. Before political independence, colonialism had sown discord through divide and rule policies that set African groups against each other. In the negotiations for independence, the colonial state in many respects restricted and falsified power struggles among African groups by skewing the power structure and its allocations to favored groups. According to O'Connell who
examined the case in Nigeria (O'Connell, 1966), the restricted political process produced a constitutional framework that failed to reflect the relative strength of the various groups within particular states. Apt examples are all over Africa: Nigeria, Burundi and Rwanda, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, and others. Colonialism also tended to keep African politicians from gaining the experience needed to teach them that power must normally be limited in its use to prevent politics from destroying those who take part in it (Lloyd, 1970; Mamdani, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003; O'Connell, 1966). The favoritism of colonialists planted suspicion and distrust among Africans. At independence the skewed power structures became difficult to sustain, and expectedly were fiercely and bitterly challenged by disadvantaged ethnic groups. In most cases this led to conflicts and in some others civil wars.

The way colonial interests destabilized Africa and continue to foster fragility is worst manifested in the manner ethnic nationalities were partitioned and/or amalgamated (Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor, 2006). In Africa, colonial rulers partitioned or amalgamated disparate ethnic and cultural nationalities without regard to cultural identities or pre-colonial territorialities. According to Asiwaju (1984), in the case of Africa's partition, the concern is with culturally coherent territories where people of definite cultural identities have had to be split into two or more units, each fraction being placed in the area of jurisdiction of a distinct state which functions to integrate such a part of a pre-existing cultural area into a new socio-economic system removed from the original cultural whole (Asiwaju, 1984, p. 2). Most parts of Africa were affected by this historically destabilizing exercise. The colonial state did not pay heed to the human factors of partition or amalgamation, in particular, the behavior of the ethnic groups in the situation of partition or amalgamation, or their responses to the new cultural partitions and amalgamations. The colonial powers were also indifferent to the collective impact of partitions and amalgamations on nation-building and national development efforts thereafter. And more importantly, Africans were neither involved nor were they consulted in the partition and amalgamation exercises (Asiwaju, 1984, pp. 8-9). As a consequence, many ethnic groups in Africa experience citizenship crises, are denied fundamental human rights, or are refugees in their homelands (Herbst, 2002; Lemarchand, 1996; Young, 1993).

For the sake of emphasis, the most questionable event of colonialism was the establishment of territorial boundaries in Africa that forced unsustainable ethnic unions and in many cases the division of ethnic groups. And understandably because there was no ideologically imbued and effective leadership before or after colonial rule, building nations out of the disparate ethnic groups became difficult. Instead, conflicts erupted as a result of the incompatible amalgams and divisions of ethnic nationalities, most of whom at independence had no experience in handling such conflicts. These conflicts have left the states fragile and unstable to this day.

Furnivall (1948) and Mill (1958) (as cited in Lijphart, 1977) warned against the difficulty of people of diverse cultures being forcefully ruled together as one political entity. According to Furnivall, members of plural cultures based on language, religion, custom, race, ethnicity or assumed blood ties live side by side but separately within the same political unit; they are strictly a medley (of people) because they mix but do not combine (as cited in Lijphart, 1977, p. 17). Plural societies are characterized by cultural differences. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways (as cited in Lijphart, 1977, pp. 16-21). According to Smith, heterogeneity automatically imposes the structural necessity for domination by one of the cultural groups; it necessitates nondemocratic regulation of group domination (Smith, 1969, p. 14). Mill goes further to observe how such a structure frustrates institutionalization of democratic practice: free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among an amalgam of people without fellow feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist (as cited in Lijphart, 1977, p. 18; Onuoha, 2004). These studies reveal the obvious impediments many African countries with heterogeneous cultures and peoples
would face being partitioned or amalgamated and ruled under one common state. But such issues were not considered during the colonial partitions and amalgamations, in spite of evidence of inherent contradictions.

Therefore, it may be argued that the actions of the colonial state are a major reason for the lack of political integration that has plagued Africa since independence. Moreover, the colonizers prepared the ground for the emergence of poor, parasitic and ineffective political leadership across the continent. The colonial state's divide and rule tactics pitted postcolonial African political leaders against each other in struggles for power dominated by ethnic politics (Nnoli, 1978). The same tactics denied Africans the emergence of effective nationalist leadership, because most of the leaders relied on ethnic and sectionalist ideologies as the only means to gain and maintain political power (Colman, 1972; Markovitz, 1977; Nnoli, 1978). At present, African political leaders are confronted with the problem of building new nations out of a mosaic of partitioned and amalgamated cultures that they lack the capacity to address. The many ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts and wars in most parts of Africa suggest that colonial partitions and amalgamations did not and could not have laid a solid foundation for nationhood in Africa, and without nationhood (or nationalism) no meaningful development may be achieved.

Unsurprisingly, the state that emerged at independence had limited autonomy (Ake, 1985). This was the case because in order for political leaders to continue to have access, control and maintain power, they needed to capture or seize the state and ensure their private interests in the political process within the state (Ake, 1985, 1994). Such a state in turn reproduced a fractured leadership that could not construct a common ideology needed for nation building. The cases examined below outline some of the complex processes at work in postcolonial Africa.

**ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

Conflict may be viewed as a form of tension arising from mutually exclusive or opposing actions, thoughts, opinions, or feelings. It is evident when individuals or groups evaluate situations or reach judgments from different perspectives stemming from incompatible differences in their education, religion, ethnic or social backgrounds, or knowledge of the issues at hand. Often conflict occurs when people or groups perceive that as a result of a disagreement there may be a threat to their interests. On the other hand, conflict may protrude from misinformation, stereotypes, prejudices, contradictory perceptions of justice, differing socio-cultural traditions, personal beliefs or ideologies. Also, conflict may be racial, sectarian, ethnic, religious, ideological, cultural, economic, political, or social in nature (Kriesberg, 1973, pp. 1-57; 2006).

In Africa, most of the conflicts brought about severe fragility of the state. By fragility we refer to the weak, unstable, porous and unacceptable unreliability of institutions and agencies of the state. As most cases of fragility in Africa became prolonged, they led to what scholars later referred to as "state failure" (Bates, 2001; Herbst, 1996/97; Rothberg, 2001; Zartman, 1995), situations where states became very insecure and lost almost every capacity to govern.

Cases of conflict can be considered ethno-religious in nature when their causes are a combination of both ethnic and religious strife. In many cases, such conflicts occur first in struggles for identity and citizenship, and second in struggles for access, management or control of political power (Herbst, 2000; Markovitz, 1977; Nnoli, 1978, 1998; Young, 1993). Often the latter is used to secure the former and to address other cases of perceived injustice, especially in the area of allocation of scarce resources and other rewards (Herbst, 2000; Post & Vickers, 1966; Young, 1993). This is the case in Liberia/Sierra Leone/Cote d'Ivoire and the Mandingo ethnic group of the Mano River Basin; the Hausa-Fulani Muslim and the other ethnic groups in Nigeria; the Zaghawa ethnic group of Sudan/ Darfur/Chad.
and Central African Republic, and the Tutsi of Burundi/Rwanda/DR Congo and the Great Lakes of East/Central Africa. In these cases, most of the conflicts ended up being political as most times their mediations were through some form of politics in another form - that is war, as the discussion below demonstrates.

**The Mandingo of West Africa**

The Mandingo are found in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, all surrounding the Mano River Basin of West Africa. The conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire revolve around the Mandingo claim to citizenship, identity and political rights in each of those countries. In Liberia, and indeed Cote d'Ivoire, the Mandingo form the core of the insurgencies responsible for the conflicts in those countries. They support their kin across the borders around the Mano River Basin. The Mandingo are not accepted as full citizens in each of the countries. In Liberia they are seen as more Guineans than Liberians (Onah, 2008). This sense of discrimination largely explains the part played by the Mandingo in the wars that devastated Liberia between 1989 and 1997 (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2005). They were the bulk of the rebels and fighting forces in the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). In the second Liberian war the Mandingos supported United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). In both wars the Mandingo fought for the right to be accepted as Liberians and to participate fully in the politics and government of Liberia (Crisis Group Africa Report 98, 2005).

In Cote d'Ivoire, the Mandingo (known as Dyula) are the reason for the war in the north of the country. The Mandingo Ivorians (Dyulas) bordering Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso were denied Ivorian citizenship and refused Ivorian identity papers (Onah, 2008). In the 1998 general elections, Alassan Quattara, a northern politician and Mandingo (Dyula), was stopped from contesting the election because both his parents were not Ivorians. The frustration of their being denied citizenship rights led to the formation of the New Front military insurgency in 2002 by the Dyula in the north of Cote d'Ivoire. They still control that part of the country even with the yet disputed election of 2010. Thus the near ten-year civil war in Cote d'Ivoire is interconnected with the northerners (the Mandingo-Dyula) fighting against what they consider discrimination on the grounds of their names and origins (Onah, 2008).

**Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria**

Aside from the long drawn out civil war in Sudan, which was ethno-religious, Nigeria in West Africa has a long standing history of ethno-religious conflicts (Lloyd, 1970; Nnoli, 1998). The country consists of a Muslim-dominated North and a Christian-dominated South. The North is largely populated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group while the South, though more ethnically diverse, is mostly comprised of Igbo and Yoruba (Kukah, 1991; Onah, 2006). The major conflicts have been ethno-religious in nature and exacerbated by Muslims’ perception that their religious values are threatened by Christians or Muslim insistence on the adoption of Muslim religious values by everyone in the country (Kukah, 1991). The conflicts are incessant as well as sporadic, but more intriguing is that most of the conflicts in Nigeria have occurred when political power was predominantly in the hands of the ethnic groups from the North. In other words, conflicts are often provoked by the ethno-religious group in control of political power. Ethno-religious conflicts have not arisen because of groups’ fears of being dispossessed or denied access to political power in the federation or citizenship. This situation is peculiar to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria (Kukah, 1991; Lloyd, 1970).

There have been over twenty major conflicts since the end of the civil war in 1970. They include the following events:

* Maitatsine religious riots in Kano, December, 1980;
* Maitatsine religious riots in Bulunkutu, Maiduguri, October, 1982;
Maitatsine religious riots in Jimeta, Yola, February, 1984;
Maitatsine religious riots in Gombe, April, 1985;
The University of Ibadan, Ibadan religious riots, May, 1986;
The Kafanchan religious riots, March, 1987;
The Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna religious disturbances, March, 1988;
Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria Sharia religious clashes, June, 1988;
The Bauchi religious riots of April, 1991;
The Kano religious riots of October, 1991;
The Zango-Kataf (in Kaduna) religious riots, February, 1992;
The Zango-Kataf (in Kaduna) religious riots, May, 1992;
Kaduna religious clashes, June and September, 1996;
Kaduna Sharia riots, February, 2000;
Gombe religious riots, February, 2000;
Kaduna Sharia riots, May, 2000;
Bauchi religious crisis, June, 2001;
Boko Haram religious disturbances in Bauchi, February, 2006;
Boko Haram religious disturbances in Bauchi and Borno, July, 2009; Borno, October, 2009; Yobe, October, 2010; Borno October and December, 2010; and Bauchi, December, 2010.

(Compiled from Nigerian daily newspapers; See also Dickson-Okezie (2006)).

As already pointed out, most of the riots above took place in the northern part of the country, which is predominantly Muslim. In some cases, as in February, 2006, there have been retaliatory attacks by Christians in the South. The most destructive of the conflicts in terms of the loss of lives and property were the Maitatisme disturbances of the 1980s, the Sharia riots of the early 2000s, and the current Boko Haram riots. Indeed, the Boko Haram (meaning "Western education is evil") has been the most dreaded, ubiquitous and the most persistent so far since it first struck in Bauchi in 2006. Religious uprisings by this sect have erupted several times in the northern part of Nigeria since 2006. The sect has been involved in many violent activities, acts of terrorism, burning of police posts and prisons and forceful release of prisoners in the northern states of Nigeria, particularly in Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and Plateau states. It has also bombed military barracks and other locations in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. Boko Haram in particular has demanded the replacement of the Federal Government of Nigeria with an Islamic government. There are suggestions that they may be connected with Al-Qaeda.

In some cases the religious disturbances in Nigeria are manifestations of political grievances, or of dissatisfaction with resource allocation or provision of services. They have also been fomented by discontent over political appointments or government restructuring of state boundaries, local government creation/limitations, or in some cases simply manifestations of civil disobedience. But each time grievances are expressed in terms of Islamic religious demands, with sects insisting, for instance, that values which are not Islamic are evil. In addition, religious conflicts are linked to ethnic cleavages since religion corresponds with ethnic affiliation in most areas.

The activities of the Boko Haram in themselves have not constituted any threat to the Nigerian state. But the mayhem committed by the fanatical religious group constitutes some security threat to the government, though none of these forms of violence may be said to have a serious wider objective of successfully seizing political power from the Central Government of Nigeria.

Nevertheless, there is a minor citizenship conflict in Nigeria (the "indigene/settler" crisis in Plateau State). This is more political than a real citizenship crisis, or demand for citizenship rights as we examined in the cases of the Zaghawa or the Tutsi. The case in Plateau, Nigeria, is a situation where a claim to being an "indigene" may enhance one's chances of attaining a political/electoral position. At the same time a "settler" may be
discriminated against in terms of the same political post; as well, if the "settler" is being
nominated for an electoral contest in the area, a person's "settler" status becomes a
disadvantage. Nevertheless, this struggle has led to major bloodshed between the indigenes
and the settlers in the Plateau since 1999 (Banjo, 2009).

The "settler/indigene" problem is a consequence of internal migration during the colonial
era when Hausa-Fulani migrants settled in large numbers on the Plateau in the 1920s and
30s (Onah, 2006, pp. 167-168). There are other socio-political arrangements, some of
which came about during the over 30 years of military rule in Nigeria, in particular from
1975 to 1999, a period which witnessed intensified political struggles among the
indigene/settler groups. One major contributing factor was the attempt by the military to
create special political territorial space for the "settlers" in the midst of geographical space
known to belong to the indigenes.

Examined from another angle, most of the conflicts in Nigeria presently are largely a
mixture of anomie, social frustration, and rejection of bad governance and official corruption.
The cases of social frustration and bad governance are true of the widely publicized oil-
rich Niger Delta region, where the conflict appears pseudo-ethnic in nature and has been
ongoing since the 1990s. Militants in the Niger Delta have been fighting against the federal
government of Nigeria and the multinational oil companies prospecting mineral oil in the
Delta because of years of neglect and lack of social amenities in the communities. The
conflicts have involved the kidnapping of oil workers, especially expatriates, and the
destruction of oil exploration/drilling facilities. However, the Nigerian government has
recently attempted to correct the problem, partly through the establishment of a ministry
in charge of the Niger Delta. The government has also granted amnesty to militants,
absolving them from criminal charges arising from the course of their insurgencies in the
Niger Delta. These recent measures are returning peace to the Niger Delta.

Other more complex ethnic insurgencies and conflicts in the quest for citizenship rights,
identity and self-determination, and access to state power are examined below through the
experiences of the Zaghawa of North Central Africa and the Tutsi of East Central Africa.

Sudan/Darfur/Chad and the Zaghawa Ethnic Group

The conflicts in Sudan fall into two categories. The first is the conflict between the central
government in the north (Khartoum) and peoples in South Sudan (Juba). The conflict
began in 1956 and officially ended with the referendum of January 2011 and the granting
of independence to South Sudan. The second is the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,
which started effectively in 2003. That conflict is still ongoing.

Modern day Sudan is made up of a blend of Nubian, Nilotic groups and some complex
mix of Arab elements from Egypt. Ethnicity in Sudan is very complicated; it is often
cultural and linguistic. The people of Sudan are fundamentally Muslims. On the other
hand, the major ethnic groups of South Sudan are the Dinka, Nuer, Bari and others. They
are African, black, traditional worshipers and animists. They became Christians by
conversion through European missionaries who followed the tracks of colonial explorers
(Flint & Waal, 2008).

It is not misleading to suggest that the major reason for the prolonged ethno-religious war
between Sudan and the peoples now in South Sudan was the British colonial masters'
design in 1956 to leave both regions as one country to be governed by the South (Sharkey,
2003). This was despite the glaring heterogeneous ethnic and religious composition of the
territory, an obvious source of conflict as peoples in both areas had not had sufficient time
for associating together. Prior to that date, regions in the north and south were governed
separately under colonial rule.
At independence in 1956, the Khartoum Government breached an understanding that a federal system of government would be established. Contrary to this agreement, a unitary form of government and Arabic as official language were imposed by Khartoum, and Sharia law instituted as the legal system (Sharkey, 2003; Sidahmed & Sidahmed, 2005). The peoples of the South felt disenfranchised and cheated; they claimed they had lost their identity, autonomy, self-determination and citizenship. Thus, they began a war of self-determination and independence in 1956 that lasted until 1972 (known as Anyanya One).

A second civil war, Anyanya Two, began in 1983 and ended in 2005. Anyanya Two was one of the longest and deadliest wars of the late 20th century. Both wars were reported to have claimed over two million lives, with more than four million forced to flee their homes, displaced in the forests at one time or the other during the war or forced to take refuge in neighboring countries. The civilian death toll was one of the highest of any war since World War II (Randolph, 2002).

With respect to Darfur, the Fur people are said to be surrounded by Arabic/quasi-Arabic nomads in the north, the northwest and the east. The African population is found in the southwest along the Chadian southern border. In terms of religion, the people of Darfur are largely Muslims. Thus, while the war with South Sudan was ethno-religious in origin, that in Darfur is more ethnic than religious because the major contenders are principally Muslims. However, ethnicity in Darfur is significantly more complex, involving a particular ethnic element, the Zaghawa ethnic group.

The Zaghawa ethnic group is found in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic, bordering the Darfur region of Sudan. Though a minority ethnic group even in Chad where they control the government, their collaboration with their kin across the Sudan/Central African Republic border has enabled them to attain power in Chad while still fighting for autonomy in Darfur (Onah, 2008). The primary reason for the Zaghawa struggle for political power is to resolve issues of citizenship in the countries where they find themselves. First, in Chad, there is Idris Déby, a Zaghawa who became president in 1990 with the support of his kin in Sudan and Central African Republic. The capture of power in Chad by this group was meant to ensure the consolidation of their Zaghawa citizenship in that country. Another goal was to strengthen the citizenship of other Zaghawa in places such as Darfur and Central African Republic. Indeed, Déby’s grand military campaign plan envisioned a “greater Zaghawa” that would include Central African Republic (Onah, 2008).

Thus, in 2003 the Zaghawa and other ethnic groups in the Darfur region of Sudan claimed that their citizenship rights were being denied by the Khartoum government. The Darfur Zaghawa were also encouraged by the war between Khartoum and South Sudan, which they reasoned would weaken Khartoum and make the government ready for a peaceful agreement that would favor citizenship and autonomy for Darfur (Onah, 2008). Accordingly, Darfur expected autonomy extended to them as a result of a possible comprehensive peace agreement between Khartoum and the South. Such an agreement was not reached when a peace accord was signed in 2005.

However, partly because of limited resources, the Déby military campaign from Chad has not been successful in achieving Darfur/Zaghawa autonomy from Sudan. It is also suggested that President Déby may not be seriously involved in the Darfur/Sudan conflict because El Bashir, the President of Sudan, helped him attain power in Chad in 1990 (Onah, 2008). At present many Zaghawa in the Chadian army oppose Déby because of his inability to support the Zaghawa in Darfur. Many Zaghawa soldiers are also based in Darfur from where they are attempting to topple Déby and the Chadian government. The latest of such attacks was in February 2008 (Onah, 2008).

Meanwhile, the war in Darfur is still raging and creating a major humanitarian crisis (Flint & de Waal, 2008, p. 126; Prunier, 2005). Indeed, the International Court at The Hague has not lifted the arrest warrant on El Bashir for war crimes in Darfur imposed on him in
Meanwhile, the Zaghawa struggle for citizenship in Sudan remains unresolved, somewhat like the case of the Tutsi of the Great Lakes Region of East Central Africa.

**DR Congo/Rwanda and the Tutsi of Great Lakes of East Africa**

Almost immediately after independence in Congo (DR Congo) in 1960, secession and ethnic wars ensued, with three separate governments proclaimed: the central government in Kinshasha (Leopoldville) under Patrice Lumumba, Katanga Republic under Moise Tshombe, and Republic of Kassai, under Albert Kalonji. The war was in search of self-determination and independence for Katanga and the other ethnic nationalities of the Congo (Lemarchand, 1964; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003). The war claimed the life of the first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. The Katanga rebellion could not be contained until 1965 when Joseph Mobutu Sese Sekou, with Western backing, seized power in a military coup. Mobutu ruled Congo (Zaire) from 1965 to 1996. Among the series of insurgencies led by ethnic militias during his tenure the most notable were still the Katanga rebellions, referred to as "Shaba rebellions" because of the name change from "Katanga" to Shaba" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003).

In 1977 and 1978, Katanga erupted again as Shaba I and II, organized from across the Congo/Angolan border. By the end of both wars over 50,000 soldiers and civilians had been killed. Mobutu's government launched reprisals that led to a mass exodus of refugees, thereby creating further instability in the Congo itself (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003). There were other attacks by Shaba nationals in 1984 and 1985. In 1993 the regional Governor of Shaba Province, Anthoine Gabriel Kynuguwa Kunwanz, again proclaimed Sahaba's autonomy. He launched a wave of ethnic pogroms, especially against the Kassai Luba (Baluba) people. This resulted in the death of thousands of people, and mass expulsions of non-Shaba ethnic groups (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003). Mobutu's rule for over three decades in the Congo was among the most gruesome, enduring, and corrupt examples of personal rule and neo-patrimony in Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003; Shraeder, 2004).

The ethnic conflicts in Zaire and the attempt to topple Sese Sekou from power in the 1990s reignited the Tutsi struggle for citizenship in the countries of the Great Lakes region of East and Central Africa where they live as minorities. The Tutsi ethnic group is found in the Great Lakes region in DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania (Lemarchand, 1996; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003). Ethnic conflicts involving the Tutsi arose from their quest for citizenship in those countries, especially in Rwanda from where they were expelled and stripped of citizenship in 1961 by the predominantly Hutu ethnic group. Colonial policies skewed political power in favor of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda, but with democracy at independence in 1960, the Hutu majority took power and displaced the Tutsi. By 1961, a majority of the Tutsi had fled Rwanda because of persecution by the Hutu. They took refuge with fellow Tutsi already residing around the Great Lakes, including in Burundi, where they (the Tutsi) still held power (Lemarchand, 1996). Meanwhile, Tutsi exiles from Rwanda were stripped of Rwandan citizenship at home, and not allowed to return, an aftermath of the struggles in 1960/61. Thus, while in exile they were stateless and without citizenship. Intermittent conflicts through military invasions occurred between 1964 and 1988 as Tutsi exiles attempted to return to Rwanda. These attempts produced more Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. As the number of Tutsi refugees increased and Rwanda continued to deny them citizenship, pressure began to mount on the Tutsi refugees in the various enclaves in the region. The most disturbing issue to the Tutsi was their expulsion from Uganda in 1982 where they had previously enjoyed citizenship and had been fairly well accommodated. Ethnic persecution of the Tutsi arose partly as reprisals from other ethnic groups who considered the Tutsi to have had power disproportionate to their numbers under colonial rule (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003; Mamdani, 2002; Onah, 2006).

Thus, having been expelled from Rwanda (1961), and stripped of citizenship in that country, and expelled from Uganda in 1982 by the second Milton Obote government, Tutsi in the
Great Lakes allied themselves with kin elsewhere to fight for citizenship in Rwanda, Uganda and DR Congo at different times between 1964 and 2006. Accordingly, the Tutsi formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army in 1990, an outcome of the Tutsi citizenship crisis in Uganda. The Patriotic Army invaded Rwanda in 1994, installing a Tutsi government and bringing about the most horrendous genocide in Africa, the Rwandan Genocide (Mamdani, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003; Onah, 2006). Earlier, it was the Rwanda Tutsi who formed the core of the National Resistance Army in Uganda between 1981 and 1986 that overthrew the Obote government in 1986.

In other to avoid yet another expulsion, this time from the Congo, the Tutsi helped form the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL-CZ) in 1996 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003; Onah, 2006, 2008), fighting to overthrow Mobutu Sese Sekou and later Laurent Kabila in DR Congo in 1997. The Tutsi also formed another alliance, Rally for Democracy (during the great wars of the Congo) with the support of the governments of fellow Tutsi in Rwanda and Uganda, successfully overthrowing Kabila. The Tutsi fought Kabila because he no longer protected their citizenship interests in the Congo. The great wars of the Congo, also known as "Africa's Second War," involved over eight African countries led by Rwanda and Uganda (Mamdani, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003; Turner, 2007) and raged on until a peace treaty was signed in 2006 that led to democratic elections and the installation of Joseph Kabila as president.

Therefore, put in perspective, the Sudan/Darfur/Chad/Zaghawa conflicts on the one hand, and DR Congo/Rwanda/Tutsi ethnic wars together with the Rwandan genocide on the other, have provided the ugliest reminders of the consequences of earlier colonial partitions and amalgamations in Africa (Aghemelo & Ibhashebor, 2006; Asiwaju, 2003). The impacts of these ethnic wars have given rise to a state fragility characterized by insecurity of life and property, migration/refugee crises, poverty, disease, crime, and a lack of capacity to govern. State fragility frustrates the emergence of nationalist leadership and the development of an ethos needed for African development in the 21st century.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Cultural and ethnic divisions in Africa aggravated by colonial partitions and amalgamations are so overwhelming for Africans and the world that an agreeable solution appears not readily feasible at this time or in the foreseeable future.

This paper has isolated four ethno-religious conflicts, suggesting that there is a need to systematically re-examine the pre-colonial boundaries of some clearly problematic African ethno-religious contrivances. It is the view of the paper that autonomy/self-rule or independence be granted to those ethnic nationalities with ethnic, cultural and religious differences that are irrecoginably tied to the states that presently have not allowed them self-determination. Interestingly, at the time of writing, the case of South Sudan has been resolved, except to add that the nearly 50-year blood bath was avoidable. Accordingly, Darfur should also be granted autonomy and self-rule from Sudan.

The current constitution of DR Congo appears to allow a degree of autonomy to some 26 provinces (Turner, 2007). But it may still be too early to know whether an answer has been found to end the country's four decade war in search of citizenship. The current president, Joseph Kabila, is a young man. Will he be prepared to step down from office after a second term, or will he tamper with the constitution to allow him extended time in office? Perhaps, it is at that juncture that we may begin to better appreciate whether or not self-determination has been granted to the ethnic nationalities that now comprise DR Congo. A criticism leveled against the current constitution is that it is silent on many vital issues related to autonomy, self-determination and citizenship (Turner, 2007). The view of the paper is that DR Congo needs to grant self-determination to all major ethnic nationalities, including those in Shaba Province, to reduce conflict and allow for development.
of the region. This view challenges that of Turner (2007), who suggests that a majority of the people favor a united DR Congo, to spite foreigners (the Tutsis) responsible for the conflict in the Congo.

Beyond Burundi and Rwanda, the Hutus and Tutsis are scattered all over the Great Lakes Region. As a way of getting over their conflicts, and because both Burundi and Rwanda are already limited in size, a Swiss type of federation might be constructed in this instance (Church, 2004; Fahmi, 2003). In such an arrangement, the Hutus and Tutsis would each be allocated full autonomy within the country as federal state and political power would be fully devolved to local/provincial ethnic units. Each group would have a visible seat of government with a provincially elected body of legislators and provincial/local police as would be normally possible in a federal arrangement of provinces/states. This would require the support of the African Union and United Nations for the enforcement and supervision of the procedure, in order to ensure the success of the arrangements. Indeed, Rwanda is still fragile, and according to Mwambari and Schaeffer (2008), the current state of peace is tenuous.

Ethno-religious conflicts in Africa are not all of the same magnitude. Some are fairly manageable, and are being fairly accommodated by the states in question. In those places and situations where ethnic relations are not too serious, Asiwaju (1984, p. 12) has suggested that border regions be deliberately carved out as distinct areas wherever former colonial powers divided ethnic groups and granted specially approved features and regulations. According to Asiwaju, such regions should be contrived so as to allow for the idiosyncrasies typical of border societies, particularly in cases with strands of ethnic groups on both sides of a border linking two different countries (Asiwaju, 1984, p. 13). He further suggests that Africa should develop a special border region policy to encourage cohesion among divided ethnic groups particularly where it is not possible to create fully different entities such as provinces or new states for such groups (Asiwaju, 1984, pp. 11-13).

It is clear that the non-violability of African boundaries, contained in the charter of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Brownlie, 1971, p. 3), is no longer tenable (Asiwaju, 1984, p. 13; Bello, 2001), particularly when one considers the current global emphasis on self-determination and human rights. Africa and the international community should systematically and methodologically study Africa's pre-colonial ethnic boundaries with the aim of providing solutions to lingering ethno-religious conflicts.

The cases of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia of the recent past reveal to Africa that political will and the granting of autonomy to nationalities not only ensures peaceful co-existence and saves lives and resources, but also provides the time and resources needed for nations to develop. The former Soviet Union was divided into 15 independent countries; the former Yugoslavia, by 2008, had evolved into 7 countries; and the former Czechoslovakia became 2 republics. In spite of the bloodshed experienced as the new entities emerged, there is no doubt that the self-determination achieved by nationalities in the former socialist countries identified could no longer be delayed and the pros of the political changes outweighed the cons. The unification of Germany in 1990 also supports the argument in this paper favoring the bringing together of ethnic groups divided by illogical political boundaries, in this case one created in the wake of World War II.

African leaders in the 18th and 20th centuries lost a historic chance to establish the hegemony needed to assist nation-building as had taken place in world regions such as Europe. The activities and nation-building efforts of Usman Dan Fodio (Nigeria) in the 1700s and 1800s (Last, 1970), the Old Oyo Empire (Nigeria), also at that time (Smith, 1989); the Buganda Empire (Uganda), of the late 1800s and early 1900s (Denis, 1966) and the empire of Shaka Zulu (South Africa), also during the 1800s (Omer-Cooper, 1966), were early attempts at nation-building that might have reproduced nation-states in Africa but were eventually thwarted by colonial rule.
Those attempts involved the types of historical processes that produced the European states that emerged at the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The treaty marked the beginning of the modern European nation-state system (Holsti, 1992) that was later transferred to the rest of the world. The DR Congo/Great Lakes wars of 1996 to 2005, including also the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, were no worse than the European wars (of "blood and iron") that led to the Treaty of Westphalia (Holsti, 1992). But it is instructive to observe that the Treaty was not negotiated without territorial studies and the consideration of nationalities and statehood through border and boundary adjustments.

From the example of Europe, and drawing from the examples of the ethno-religious conflicts analyzed herein, the future of Africa indeed will require boundary restructuring to promote balanced and fair notions of nationhood and citizenship. The present state structures found in different parts of Africa are not conducive for good leadership and good governance. If boundary changes are not made, most African states will not attain the capacity to manage the vast territories they claim to govern due to incessant conflicts. For example, the distance from Kinshasa, the capital of DR Congo, to Bunia in the northeast of that country is the same distance by air as from Paris to Moscow, or from Western to Eastern Europe. Which African leaders have the capacity to develop such a vast territory? This is a problem throughout Africa, particularly as the size of countries in some cases is synonymous with complexity and ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Like Eastern Europe, Africa in any event will require constitutionally based territorial restructuring in order to promote peace, stability and economic growth.

Africa's peoples will not prosper in the midst of ethno-religious hatred, mistrust, and mutual suspicion. These negative variables of social relations discourage nation-building and human security no matter how long conflicting ethno-religious groups live together. In the coming decades Africa will fare much better if self-determination, autonomy or independence are granted to ethnic nationalities wherever needed as overcoming ethno-religious divisions is essential for Africa to experience sustainable and equitable development in the 21st century.

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